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Homeownership and Land Use Controls:
A Dynamic Model with Voting and Lobbying
Abstract
Homeowners have incentives to control and limit local land development and anecdotic
evidence suggests that ‘homevoters’ indeed actively support restrictive measures. Yet, US
metro area level homeownership rates are strongly negatively related to corresponding
measures of the restrictiveness of land use regulation. To shed light on these seemingly
contradictory stylized facts, we present a dynamic model with a planning board that
maximizes a weighted social welfare function (SWF). The SWF can be interpreted as the
reduced form of various political economy models of voting and lobbying. We consider three
special cases: a median voter model, a probabilistic voting model, and an ‘influence for sale’
model. In all three cases conditions exist that predict outcomes which are consistent with the
presented stylized facts. Generally, our model predicts that the homeownership rate has an
ambiguous effect on the regulatory restrictiveness.
JEL classification: H7, Q15, R52.
Keywords: Homeownership, land use regulations, voting, lobbying.
11. Introduction
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the cost of land use regulation as a determinant of
house prices in the United States is highly significant.1 For example, according to
conservative estimates by Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005a), the cost induced by land use
regulation explains more than 50 percent of house prices in Manhattan or San Francisco. In
this context it is often asserted that tight land use controls are the result of politically active
homeowners who constrain land use in order to maximize the values of their homes. Indeed,
plenty of anecdotic evidence suggests that ‘homevoters’ opt for restrictive zoning measures to
protect the values of their homes (Fischel 2003). However, empirical evidence seems to
suggest otherwise. The arguably most tightly regulated locations in the US (Manhattan, the
Bay Area, Los Angeles) have among the lowest homeownership rates. Table 1 documents the
homeownership rates of 21 US metropolitan areas along with two measures of regulatory
restrictiveness – the ‘regulatory tax’ as estimated by Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005a) and
the ‘regulatory index’ as developed by Saks (2005).2 Both measures of regulatory
restrictiveness are strongly negatively correlated with the homeownership rate
(-0.52; -0.65). Figure 1 illustrates the negative relationship between the homeownership rate
and the corresponding ‘regulatory index’.
Figure 1: Homeownership Rates and the Restrictiveness of Land Use Regulation
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1 The economic significance of the regulatory cost is not confined to the United States or the housing market.
Empirical evidence by Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) and Cheshire and Hilber (2006) suggest that the economic
cost of land use regulation – both in the residential and the office sector – are orders of magnitude greater in the
UK and a number of European cities than in the United States.
2 Saks (2005) created a “comprehensive index of housing supply regulation” by using the simple average of
six independent surveys carried out between the late 1970s and the late 1980s. The method of index construction
is described in detail in the Data Appendix of Saks (2005).
2One additional result from Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005a) is that the ‘regulatory’ tax
is estimated to be much larger for Manhattan than for the entire New York metro area, while
the homeownership rate is much lower in Manhattan compared to the surrounding suburbs.
Finally, Rudel (1989) documents that Connecticut’s (high homeownership rate-)
municipalities located at a greater distance to New York City adopted land-use laws later than
(low homeownership rate-) municipalities closer to the CBD.
In this paper we provide a theoretical framework that sheds light on the link between the
homeownership rate and the regulatory restrictiveness. In particular, we demonstrate that the
above stylized facts can be reconciled with the notion that homeowners’ voting and local
political activities are guided by their concerns about home values (even in a setting where the
regulatory restrictiveness is determined by the median voter).
More specifically, we postulate a ‘dynamic’ version of the monocentric city model (see
Brueckner 1987 or Fujita 1989 for expositions of the standard monocentric city model); we
consider three groups of agents: renters (people who do not own the dwelling in which they
reside), homeowners (people who own the dwelling in which they reside) and absentee
landowners (people who rent out the dwelling(s) they own (‘landlords’) or people who own
undeveloped land). In a static model, a homeowner is an agent such that the landlord and the
tenant are a single person (or household). Thus, the utilitarian social welfare function for a
city inhabited by homeowners only will be identical to the utilitarian social welfare function
inhabited by pairs made of one absentee landlord and one renter (in an ordinal sense). As a
result, the homeownership rate plays no role in the social planner’s choice in this simple
model.
In a dynamic model in which different groups of agents make different tenure choices,
this equivalence no longer holds and the homeownership rate becomes an important
parameter of the model. In particular, many authors argue informally or formally that a given
jurisdiction will adopt tighter land use regulations, the higher its homeownership rate (e.g.,
Fischel 2003, Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks 2005b, Ortalo-Magne and Prat 2005). We qualify
this proposition and show conditions under which it holds and conditions under which it does
not. We articulate these conditions mostly in terms of political economy forces; in particular,
we consider both voting and lobbying models.
3Our strategy is to postulate a quite general weighted social welfare function that can be
seen as the reduced form of the various political economy models we consider.3 That is, the
(local or regional) planning board is interpreted as a social planner that takes into account the
weighted sum of the individual welfare of the agents with a stake in the (local or regional)
planning outcomes. The advantage of this modeling strategy is to make clear the economic
and political circumstances under which the amount of land use regulation and the
homeownership rate are positively correlated – as it should be according to frequent claims
made in the literature. As we shall see, this positive relationship is not robust in theory; yet,
this is unsurprising in the light of the stylized facts we uncover above.
Our first result is that the homeownership rate does not matter in determining the
equilibrium regulatory tax in very special circumstances only, namely, in a model in which all
agents effectively discount the future at the same rate (as they are implicitly assumed to do in
a static model). In such a model, any regulatory tax involves a pure transfer from tenants to
landlords, so a utilitarian planning board is indifferent as to the level of the regulatory tax (in
the absence of risk aversion, distribution does not matter to the utilitarian planner). We then
propose a series of results that are the outcome of the dynamic structure of our model. As a
benchmark, in the absence of homeowners, we show that the utilitarian planner chooses either
the policy most preferred by the landlords or the policy preferred by the tenants; this is in
stark contrast to the previous result. Our third result demonstrates that the regulatory tax is
generally non-decreasing in the homeownership rate in the median voter model. As we show,
this result is not robust. Specifically, in a probabilistic voting model (which might look like a
benign alteration of the median voter model), our fourth result establishes that the two
variables are negatively correlated. Our last result shows that the same holds true in a
lobbying model in which pressure groups ‘buy influence’.
Before proceeding with our analysis, it is useful to emphasize our contribution in light of
previous work. Our paper is related to a number of theoretical studies analyzing the causes of
land use regulation and, in particular, the role of homeownership. When trying to explain the
causes of land use regulation, one popular hypothesis is the so-called ‘homevoter hypothesis’
(Fischel 2003), which suggests that homeowners have an incentive to protect their house
values and that they therefore vote for restrictive zoning measures. Similar to Fischel (2003)
we also argue that individual homeowners are in favor of land use restrictions. Merely, we
point out that in a setting where land use regulations are partly determined by lobbying (in
3 When each individual’s utility gets an equal weight, this social welfare function coincides with the
utilitarian one.
4addition to or instead of a voting process), a higher homeownership rate can be negatively
associated with land use regulation. The intuition is that landlords who rent out their property
have even stronger (purer) interests in regulating land use than homeowners who can be
considered as landlords who rent to themselves.4 A few theoretical papers have formally
linked the homeownership rate to the restrictiveness of land use regulation. Glaeser, Gyourko
and Saks (2005b) develop a political economy model of zoning determination in which the
political game is a struggle between homeowners and developers. One key prediction of their
model is that the homeownership rate is positively related to the tightness of land use
regulation. In contrast, in the present paper we identify alternative effects of homeownership
that, empirically, seem to overwhelm the Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005b) effect in our
cross-section of US metropolitan areas. The only paper we are aware of that predicts a
negative relationship between the homeownership rate and land use regulation is the static
model by Brueckner and Lai (1996). Similar to our framework, Brueckner and Lai (1996)
focus on the distinction between ‘absentee landowners’ (in our terminology: ‘landlords’) and
‘resident landowners’ (homeowners who pay rent to themselves). Our model differs from
Brueckner and Lai (1996) in that we consider a dynamic framework and different models of
voting and lobbying. For a more extensive review of the literature we refer to Hilber and
Robert-Nicoud (2006).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the section below we first outline the
structure of our model. In Section 3 we investigate the relationship between land use
regulation and social welfare; our criterion is a weighted social welfare function which is the
reduced form of various voting and lobbying models (as well as of the utilitarian social
welfare function). Section 4 then discusses three political economy models as special cases:
the median voter model, a probabilistic voting model and a lobbying model. The final section
summarizes our findings and reconciles them with the stylized fact that motivates this paper.
2. Model
We consider three groups of agents: ‘renters’ (people who do not own the dwelling in which
they reside), ‘homeowners’ (people who own the dwelling in which they reside, i.e. owners-
occupiers) and ‘absentee landowners’ (people who rent out the dwelling(s) they own
4 In fact, as we demonstrate the negative link between the homeownership rate and the tightness of land use
regulation can even be the outcome of a median voter model under some parameter configurations; this is the
result of the convexity of the tenants’ objective function.
5(‘landlords’) or people who own undeveloped land). In a static model, a homeowner is an
agent such that the landlord and the tenant are a single person (or household).
Assumptions and basic structure
We study the determinants of the welfare of households living in a given jurisdiction, J. We
assume that this jurisdiction is a simple, open monocentric city. In this city, each household
earns an exogenous wage w at the CBD and lives at some distance h from it. Each household,
which is composed of one individual, consumes an exogenous amount of land, normalized to
one unit; there is one dwelling per unit of land.5 As a result, we can identify each household
by the variable h without risking confusion. Commuting from her residence to her working
place costs dollars per unit distance and per unit of time. Thus, for the household h from the
CBD, the commuting cost ish.
Tenants and landlords
Consider tenants first. The instantaneous utility such a household earns is equal to
(1) ( ) ( )u h w T h R h   
where T is a tax levied per unit of land to be determined later on and R (h) is the ‘net’ rent
paid by the individual tenant living at distance h from the CBD (more on the distinction
between the gross and net rents shortly). Let N be the equilibrium population in city J. There
is perfect competition on the market for dwellings, thus at equilibrium landlords post rents
R(h) such that R(N)=0 at the fringe and u(h) is everywhere the same:
(2) ( ) ( , )u h w T N u N T   
This way, at equilibrium, households are indifferent as to where they live in the city. Thus, the
utility they achieve, u, is a function of parameters of the model (and w) and of endogenous
variables to be determined later (N and T).
Land use in city J is being regulated and this generates a shadow tax, in the spirit of
Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005a). Specifically, land use restrictions distort land use choices
and thus increase the value of land already being developed. Thus, this ‘tax’ is paid by the
5 Conceptually, these assumptions are easy to relax but in the present setting the model would become
intractable.
6tenants to the landlords. More precisely, this tax is capitalized in the price of land and renters
actually pay the gross rent given by
(3) ( , ) ( ) ( ) .r h T T R h N h T    
The value of a dwelling unit located at distance h from the CBD is thus equal to the
present value of the stream of gross rents, namely
(4)    
0
( )
0, ( ) , ( ) d
t
t
W h T t e r h T t t

 
where is the discount rate andis the dying rate, i.e. the expected duration of a building is
1/years. (At each time t, there is a probabilitythat the dwelling unit collapses.)
In the remainder of the paper, we study the properties of the stationary steady state; thus, from
now on, we can omit the time variable t and normalize t0=0. At steady state, (4) simplifies to
(5) ( )
0
( , )
( , ) ( , )dt
r h T
W h T e r h T t  

   
The average value of all dwelling units in this jurisdiction is given by
(6)
0
1 1( ) ( , )d ( )
2
N NW T W h T t T
N

 
  

where we have used (3) to derive the second equality. It is readily verified that the average
value of the dwelling is increasing in the size of the population (a demand effect) and in the
shadow tax on land use (as usual, this tax introduces a wedge between the demand and the
supply prices, thus restricting the quantity consumed at equilibrium). As a result, absentee
owners of developed land (whom we call ‘landlords’) in contrast to owners of undeveloped
land) are in principle favorable to attracting more people (which increases demand for land in
the jurisdiction) and to restrict land use more stringently (for a given population size, this
increases demand for each unit of land already developed). Landlords who are absentee do not
commute to the CBD so the value of being a landlord in this jurisdiction is W(T) on average.
We assume that every so often, tenants are hit by a shock and leave jurisdiction J (to get
married, start another job or retire in a sunny location, say). We model this by assuming that
at each period of time dt each household faces a probabilityTdt to leave J; for the time being,
7we takeT as exogenous; we relax this assumption in the Appendix.6 When they leave the
monocentric city to another one, these tenants earn an exogenous TW , which includes the
moving costs CT and could be negative. As a result of these assumptions, the option value of
being a tenant is equal to ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , )] [ ( ', ) ( , )]T T T T T Tj j jW h T u h T W W h T W h T W h T       ,
where the first term is the flow of instantaneous utility and the last term is the capital gain that
arises when the tenant has to move out because her dwelling collapses; by virtue of (2),
u(h’,T)=u(h,T) and thus the last term in this expression is zero. Solving for WT(h,T), we
obtain:
(7)
1
( , ) ( , )T T TTW h T u h T W 
   
By virtue of (2), this is equal to the average value of being a renter in jurisdiction J, which is
equal to
(8)
0
1 1
( ) ( , ) d ( )
2
N
T T T T
T
N
W T W h T t w T W
N
      
which is decreasing in N (because of congestion) and T (because this increases the rent).
Homeowners
Turn now to the homeowners. Homeowners pay rents to themselves and commute to the
CBD, so the option value of homeownership at distance h from the CBD is equal to
( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )] ( , )O O O O OW h T w h W W h T W h T W h T         , where the first term is the
flow of instantaneous utility, the second term is the expected capital gain that such a
household pockets when she sells her property; this arises with probability Odt and, when
this happens, the household sells her house at its market price, W(h,T), forgoes the value of
being the owner of her dwelling, WO(h,T), and earns an exogenous OW in the new dwelling,
which includes the moving costs CO and could be negative; like tenants, we assume that
whenever homeowners are hit by such a shock they move out of the city and relocate
elsewhere. Solving for WO(h,T), we get
6 All the results we derive in this paper are robust to this extension. This extension is interesting insofar as we
provide microeconomic foundations for having T≠O.
8(9) 1( , ) ( ( , ) ) .O O TOW h T w h W h T W   
      
As before, we can compute the average value of being a homeowner in this city; using (6) this
is equal to
(10)
0
1 1
( ) ( , )d ( ) ( ) .
2 2
N O
O O O O
O
N N
W T W h T t w W T
N
      
          
Note that homeowners are renting to themselves so, like tenants, they dislike congestion
and regulatory taxes (this is captured by the term in the first parenthesis in the right-hand side
of the expression above) but, like landlords, they benefit form congestion and regulation. The
net effect is ambiguous and depends on the average length of the tenure duration, equal to
1/O.
This is the central element to our argument. To understand what is at stake, note that
when homeowners frequently change locations (O>1), then their economic interests are
similar to those of the landlords because they sell their asset, which capitalizes the tax T and
the congestion of land, equal toN/2; by contrast, when they rarely change location (O<1),
they dislike congestion but still value regulation (this is because regulation creates no cost to
them).
Before developing this line of reasoning further, let us close the model by explaining how
N is pinned down at equilibrium.
Equilibrium
When households (tenants or homeowners) consider living in jurisdiction J or in another one,
they compare the utility they would obtain in city J, which we generically denote by V
(V=WO,WT), and the highest utility they would obtain elsewhere, which we denote as V . For
simplicity, we assume here that V is exogenous.7 Next, we assume that households value
natural and cultural amenities as well as economic wellbeing when they make their location
decision. Cities differ in that respect, so even if V V , some households might choose to
reside in the jurisdiction generating a poorer economic wellbeing (J in this case) because they
like the climate, the variety of restaurants and the quality of its museums and theatres more
7 This assumption is immaterial for our purposes; the interested reader might turn to Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud (2006), where we relax this assumption.
9than the same variables in the alternative location. As in Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2006), we
assume that households are heterogeneous in the sense that their private valuation of the
natural and cultural amenities of the various locations differ; some people value mild and dry
climates a lot more than the proximity of icy summits than others. Hence, given V , the
fraction of the population that decides to reside in J is equal to ( )G V V ; let the total
population be fixed to NTOT; as a result of this assumption, the actual mass of people living in
J will be equal to
(11) ( ) ( ) TOTN T G V V N 
The first derivative of N with respect to T is negative, namely, the current level of regulation
increases the cost of residing in our jurisdiction, thus fewer people actually want to live there.
For the time being, we do not specify any functional form for G(.), but we assume that its
shape is such that the following holds:
(12)
2
02
20, 0, limT T
N N NN
T T T 
     
  
For further reference, it is useful to characterize the amount of land use regulation that
maximizes the average gross rent in this economy. Define TL as the tightness of the land use
restriction that maximizes (6), i.e.
(13) arg max ( ) 1 0
2 L
L
T
T
NT W T
T
    

Given our assumptions in (12), TL is a strictly positive and finite number. To avoid discussing
uninteresting cases, we impose the restriction N(TL)>0.
By the same token, let us define TO as the optimal regulation from the homeowners’ point
of view, namely
(14) arg max ( ) 1 (1 ) 0
2 O
O O
T O
T
NT W T
T
  

      
if O>+and there is no real solution to this problem otherwise. In economic language, if the
likelihood at each point in time that a homeowner leaves J, sells her dwelling and pockets its
value is high (i.e. if O>+) then she looks like a landlord and she favors mild land use
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regulation; by contrast, if this probability is low, then she favors the toughest possible
regulation because she wants to reduce the size of the population as much as possible to
reduce congestion. From (12), it is clear that TO>TL holds for any finiteO, namely,
homeowners always favor more regulation than landlords. This confirms Fischel (2003) and
other authors’ claims that homeowners strongly favor land use regulations (but see Brueckner
and Lai 1996 for a qualification of this result).
Finally, tenants’ objective function is the mirror image of the landlords’, so WT(T) has a
U-shape reaching an interior minimum at TL. As a result, tenants’ preferred regulatory tax is
either 0 (in which case they would favour a negative regulation if they could) or extreme
regulation, depending on the sensitivity of N to T in (12). Specifically, assuming that N(T) is
bounded above and that the support of T is max[0, ]T (where Tmax could be arbitrarily large),
we obtain
(15) max
max
max
[0, ]
max
(0) ( )
0,arg max ( ) 2 2
, otherwise
T T
T T
N N T
TT W T
T
 

   

3. Land use regulation and welfare
In this section, we ask the question ‘to what extent is land use restriction desirable?’. Our
criterion is a weighted social welfare function which is the reduced form of many possible
models of voting and lobbying. In the next section, we then look at three special cases: when
the social welfare function corresponds to
 The preferred platform of the median voter.
 The outcome of a probabilistic voting model à la Hinich (1977).
 The outcome of a lobbying model à la Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Before doing so, let us introduce the utilitarian benchmark and use it to stress the
conditions under which the equivalence between a homeowner and a pair made of a tenant
and a landlord holds.
Utilitarian benchmark and static model
For simplicity, assume that the population of J is fixed (we relax this assumption shortly),
thus NT=0. Let the homeownership rate in jurisdiction J be exogenous and denote it by. A
utilitarian planner (who also takes into account the welfare of the absentee landlords) would
11
then maximise the sum of each individual’s W; with a given population size, this is equivalent
to maximising the average of the W’s, thus
(16)
( ) ( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
constant + ( ) ( )
2
1
(1 ) ( ) ( )
2
Utilitarian O T
O
O
T
T W T W T W T
N
w W T
N
W T w T
 
     
  
    
       
       
where ( ) ( / 2) /( )W T T N     from (6) and N(T) comes from (11) and (12).
Using this, we now show that a homeowner is equivalent to a landlord-tenant combo in
special circumstances only. In a static model, there are no shocks occurring, so =T=O=0;
we can also normalise to unity. As a result, (16) simplifies to
(17) ( ) constant + ( ) (1 ) constant
2 2
static N NT w w w          
which does not depend on T. Thus, in this model, the homeownership rate has no bearing on
the amount of regulation that would maximize the planner’s objective function in (17). This is
because T is a transfer from renters to landlords and this redistribution entails no deadweight
loss. Also, in the case of homeowners, this transfer is trivial since the landlord and the renter
are the same person. Note, however, thatappears in the right-hand side of (17), that is, the
impact of the congestion cost in J onis larger, the larger the homeownership rate. This is
because the rents tenants pay to landlords fully compensate for the commuting cost, whereas
homeowners don’t. Thus, in this respect, the equivalence breaks down.8
To summarize this discussion, let us write:
Proposition 1.The homeownership rate does not influence the utilitarian planner’s choice of T only in a
static version of the model in which the size of the population N is given.
In the dynamic version of the model, T is a flow transfer from tenants to landlords and, since
various groups of agents effectively discount the future differently, this equivalence breaks
down in the dynamic version of the model.
8 This is not a robust result, because the implicit assumption here is that homeowners are like settlers,
namely, they did not buy the land on which the house in which they reside stands in the first place. Assuming
instead that the current generation of homeowners did buy their house from other agents in the past and that they
borrowed to do so, then the service of the debt would look like a rent. Importantly, this rent would increase with
proximity to the CBD, so the last term in (17) would go.
12
A general social welfare function (SWF)
Let us now generalize (16) and give arbitrary weights to the various groups of agents. Let the
current size of the population be N. Assume for simplicity that the planning board maximizes
the welfare of the agents who currently have stakes in land use regulation T, namely, the
planning board puts no weight on future residents’ wellbeing.9 However, ever in this case, we
have to take into account how the welfare of each group of individuals would increase as N
varies as a result of the choice of T. In particular, owners of undeveloped land currently earn
zero but would earn a positive amount (the net rent) if the population grew; or, the owners of
developed land at the fringe would lose their earnings (the gross rent) if the population
decreased. As a result, in this case the SWF would look like
(18)
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1max 0, ( ) ( ) min 0, ( ) ( ).
O TT N aW T bW T cW T
a N T N W T T a N T N W T
 
     
       
Note that the function(T) displays a discontinuity at the T such that N(T)=N.
Let us analyze the problem into two steps. As a first step, let us analyze the first line of
(18), which does not include the wellbeing of the landlords owning land at the margin of the
city. We get:
(19)
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
constant +N
( ) ( )
[ ]
2 2
O T
O T
O
O T O
T N aW T bW T cW T
b c
w
a b c N T Nb N T
N T
    
             
     
      
               
where we have made use of (6), (8) and (10) to derive the second line. Using this expression,
we can already derive an important intermediate result:
Proposition 2. If the social planner puts no weight on the homeowners’ welfare (b=0) nor on the
absentee landowners who own land at the fringe of the city, then she maximizes the total rents of the
jurisdiction, ( ) / 2T N T , which is equivalent to maximizing W(T), or chooses T=TL, depending
on the parameters of the model.
9 This is perhaps the most reasonable assumption to make, for we view this SWF as a reduced form for
various political economy models in which agents with current stakes influence the land use planning process.
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This is an important result. It shows that when the social planner puts weight on tenants and
landlords’ wellbeing only, then she chooses a T that either maximizes tenant’s wellbeing or
landlords’ wellbeing – recall that the interests of these two groups are exactly the mirror
image of each other. More precisely, she chooses the former if the term in the first square
bracket of the third line of (19) is positive and she chooses the latter otherwise.
This result resonates with Proposition 1. In a static model, b=0 would have made the
planner indifferent as to the choice of T. In a dynamic model, however, landlords and tenants
discount the future differently and thus a pure transfer between these two groups might
increase or decrease welfare. To understand the economic forces that drive this result, let us
impose b=0 and a=c=1 in (19) and omit the terms that do not include T or N(T) and write
(20) 1( ) 1 1 ( )0, 1 ( )[ ].
2T
T N Tb a c T
N

   
      
 
As a result, the T that maximizes 1(T) is TL>0 only if T, namely, if the frequency at
which tenants leave their dwelling is larger that the frequency at which the value of the land
on which the dwelling stands is destroyed; otherwise, the planner chooses TL{0,Tmax}.
Realistically,is equal to zero as a first order approximation, so the planner chooses T as if
she was only tacking into account the wellbeing of the landlords. This is because the value of
a property is the discounted sum of all future rents, whereas current tenants will have left in a
finite lifetime.
4. Three special cases
In this section, we consider three special cases of (16). The first two cases concern electoral
politics, namely, we consider in turn the median voter model and a probabilistic voting model.
The third case we deal with in this section is a post-election politics model, namely, a model
in which organized groups lobby incumbent governments (or more precisely, planning
boards). We conclude this section with a discussion of a model in which both pre- and post-
electoral politics considerations play a role.
Median voter model
Many authors, among whom Fischel (1990a and 1990b) figures prominently, argue that land
use regulations can be best thought of as the outcome of a voting model, namely, J’s
authorities implement the T that would be favored by the median voter. Denote the fraction of
homeowners in this jurisdiction by, as before, and let us assume for simplicity that tenants
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rent their dwellings from absentee landlords. In other words, homeowners own only one
dwelling – the one they occupy.10 Under these assumptions, the objective function of the
jurisdiction’s authorities is a special case of (18), as follows11:
(21)
( ), if .5
( )
( ), if .5
O
median
T
W T
T
W T


   
that is, a=0 and b+c=1, with b=1 if homeowners form the majority of the population and c=1
if they don’t. As a result, we have
(22) 0
0, if .5
arg max ( )
, if .5
O
median median
T T
T
T T
T


     
Thus, we have shown:
Proposition 3. In the median voter model, the shadow tax on land use, Tmedian, is non-decreasing in the
homeownership rate if TT=0.
Note that we get the opposite result if TT=Tmax . Thus, the result in Proposition 3 is not
robust, as we claim throughout the paper.
Probabilistic voting model
In many circumstances, the median voter model is naïve. In our case, many jurisdictions in
the United States and other countries have a homeownership rate larger than one half, thus the
model predicts that such jurisdictions should all have the same T, conditional onand N.
A deeper reason why the median voter model is dubbed as too unrealistic by many
authors is that candidates do not know the identity of the median voter. Also, in reality,
candidates are never perceived as perfect substitutes by voters and each voter’s perception of
their differences is idiosyncratic (Hinich 1977, Persson and Tabellini 2000). For all theses
reasons, these authors have adopted a discrete choice approach to voting, whereby each
individual makes a deterministic choice based on each candidate’s platform and her
perception of the other attributes of the candidates, but these choices cannot be observed by
the candidates themselves – they only know the distribution of these preferences.
10 The outcome that results from relaxing this assumption will become clear from our last special case.
11 We omit the case=.5, which occurs with probability zero.
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As a result of these assumptions, the objective function of each individual will enter the
objective function of the candidates, which is more realistic than the median voter model in
many circumstances. Usually, these models make the following assumptions. First, two
candidates running for office announce and commit to a platform, i.e. they both announce a
value for T. Second, observing the T’s, the voters cast their vote for either of the two
candidates. In doing so, they weigh in the difference between the W they would get under
both platforms and other exogenous characteristics of the candidate they might cherish or
disapprove of in various degrees (e.g. each candidate’ gender, their political affiliations, etc.).
Third, in the case the candidates both run on an identical platform, preferences are distributed
in the population in such a way that, in this case, each expects to receive half of the votes.
When this outcome occurs, the winning candidate is designated by tossing a coin. Fourth, the
winning candidate implements the platform on which she ran for office.
In our model, the population is made of three groups. Following Persson and Tabellini
(2000), assume that in each group both candidates running for election are equally popular a-
priori (i.e. if they propose the same platform at equilibrium, then they each receive 50% of the
vote) but that some groups have more voters with strong, inflexible, political beliefs on both
sides of the spectrum. Such ideologically heterogeneous groups have fewer swing voters and
hence they are less attractive to politicians. At equilibrium, such groups get a lower weight in
the objective function of the candidates. Specifically, assume that the idiosyncratic
component of homeowners is symmetrically distributed around zero with standard deviation
O and that the idiosyncratic component of tenants has the same distribution but with a
different standard distribution,T. Then each individual gets a weight which is inversely
proportional to the of her group (Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami 2004). In such a probabilistic
voting model, the elected official maximizes (16) with a=0 (absentee landowners don’t vote)
and b=/O and c=(1-)/T. Without loss of generality, let us normalize b to unity and
redefine c as (1 ) / /O Tc      to write
(23)
( ) ( ) ( )
1constant +N
1 ( ) 1 ( )
[ ] .
2 2
proba O T
O T
O
O T O
T N W T cW T
c w
c N T N T
N T
    
           
    
      
                  
Maximisingprroba(T) is equivalent to maximising
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2
O
proba
O T O
N T cT T     
         
       
     

The first thing to note is that if c is large enough, which arises when many swing voters are
tenants (this itself arises when the homeownership rate is low and/or when tenants are a
relatively homogenous group), then and are negative; in such a case, both candidates
choose the policy that maximizes the wellbeing of tenants, namely, they choose TT.
Assume instead thatandare both positive (which holds if>0). In this case,
(25) 0
( )
( ) arg max 1 0
2 2 proba
proba
T
T
N T N
T T T
T
  
     
is a strictly positive and finite real number if /is close enough to unity (otherwise
Tproba=TT=0). Note that/is increasing inand thus decreasing in c and increasing in.
Thus, using the necessary conditions for an interior maximum, see (12), it is readily verified
that we have
(26) 0
probaT

 
as long as bothandare positive.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In a probabilistic voting model, if tenants are numerous enough or form a group that is
homogenous enough (in and ideological sense), then the platform implemented at equilibrium by the
winning candidate is a corner solution corresponding to TL. By contrast, when homeowners are
numerous and/or homogenous enough, the platform implemented at equilibrium is an interior solution;
in this case, the equilibrium regulatory tax is decreasing in the homeownership rate. More generally, the
homeownership rate has an ambiguous effect on Tproba.
Note the contrast with Proposition 3: in the median voter model, the equilibrium regulatory
tax, Tmedian, was non-decreasing in the homeownership rate.
Lobbying: buying influence
As our last special case, consider the ‘influence for sale’ model developed by Grossman and
Helpman (1994) in a trade context and generalised in Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997)
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and simplified in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2006). In these influential papers, the authors
view lobbying as a menu-auction à la Berheim and Winston (1986) in which some special
interest groups are perfectly organised (Olson 1971) and they lobby the incumbent
government by ‘buying influence’. Specifically, such models usually make the following
assumptions.
First, for each possible policy mix that the incumbent might chose, these lobbies propose
to contribute a certain amount of money – a ‘menu’, which we can write as C(T). Such
contributions can be interpreted as outright bribes or as perfectly legal contributions to
finance electoral campaigns that will prove useful to the incumbent when she runs for re-
election (re-elections themselves are usually not modelled). The politician can accept or reject
such a contribution. If she rejects it, then she implements the utilitarian first best, call it TU.
Thus, lobbies who desire to twist the political outcome away from the first best have to
compensate the government for implementing another policy. Second, it is often assumed that
the government’s objective function, call itLobby(T), is a (linear) weighted sum of utilitarian
welfare and contributions; this assumption is helpful in making the model tractable; the
government cares about conventional welfare because it is going to seek re-election in the
future. Third, since the lobbies move last, at equilibrium they just make sure that the
government is on its participation constraint. One way to do this is for the lobby to make a
contribution schedule of the form C(T)=W(T)-B, where W(T) is the lobby’s welfare as a
function of the policy variable at stake and B is a positive scalar. This way, the incumbent is
the residual claimant on her policy choice. This assumption ensures that the equilibrium is
unique (it also has the attractive feature to be the unique coalition-proof equilibrium among
all the possible contribution schedules).
An important general result is the following. For simplicity, assume that only one lobby is
organized and offers contributions to the government. Let TW be the regulatory tax that
maximizes the lobby’s W(T) and assume without loss of generality that it is different from
TU. Assume further thatLobby(T) has a unique, interior maximum and that it is continuously
differentiable. Then we can establish the following result:
Proposition 5. Assume that W(T) andLobby(T) has a unique, interior maximum and that it is
continuously differentiable. Let TLobby be the regulatory tax that maximizesLobby(T). Then the
government implements TLobby, which is between TU and TW, is being offered C(TLobby)and accepts the
contribution.
18
The intuition for this result is as follows (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2006). Since the
government default policy is to implement the first best, the welfare cost of any (small)
deviation from its preferred policy is negligible. By contrast, the gain for the lobby is first
order large, and hence the lobby is better off compensating the government to implement
TLobby rather than TU.
We could almost apply this result without alteration to our setting; however, the shape of
Lobby violates some of the properties assumed in Proposition 5, so we have to be more
careful.
To streamline the argument in this subsection, imagine that the incumbent government
caters to the interests of the lobbies only. Also, assume that tenants and homeowners are not
organized and thus do not lobby the government (we relax this assumption later). Thus, there
are two groups that actively lobby the government: owners of developed land (who favor
more regulation) and owners of undeveloped land (who favor less regulation). Both groups
are ‘absentee landowners’ in the terminology we adopt in this paper. Each contribution offers
a linear contribution schedule of the form W(T)-B. As a result, the government’s objective
function is like (18) with b=c=0; normalizing a to unity, we obtain
(27)   1( ) ( ) ( ) max 0, ( ) .Lobby T N T W T N T N T     
where W(T) is given by (6).
Since this function has a discontinuity at T such that N(T)=N, we have to consider two
cases: either the parameters of the model are such that there is some pressure for more
regulation (in which case N will decrease) or they are such that there is pressure for less
regulation. Assume that there are exogenous pressures for the population to grow; other things
being equal, this pushes for more regulation (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2006). So let us
consider the case in which N(TLobby)<N at equilibrium. Let arg max ( )Lobby LobbyTT T  . In
this case, for an interior solution, the first order condition of this problem can be written as
(28)
( ) ( )
1 0
( ) 2 2 Lobby
Lobby Lobby
LobbyT
Lobby
T
N T N T N
T
N T T
        
assuming that the second order condition for a maximum holds.
Compare this to (13) and (20), namely, to the optimal solution from the point of view the
average non-marginal landlord. Here, the first term in the expression above is new; it captures
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the rents that accrue to landlords whose dwelling will be emptied at equilibrium by the
increase high equilibrium T. Since this term is negative, TLobby<TL, namely, the landlord’s
lobby takes this loss of revenue into account.
In the opposite case, namely, when N(TLobby)>N at equilibrium, then TLobby solves instead
(29) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 0
( ) 2 2 Lobby
Lobby Lobby Lobby
T
Lobby
T
N T N T N T N
N T N T
           
and is again larger than TL for the same reason. Thus, in this respect, the qualitative result is
the same. The difference comes from the fact that the regulatory tax is being felt for new
developments (and is capitalized in the price of all), so this tax conveys no benefit to the
owners of newly developed land.
What happens if homeowners or tenants are also organized? In either case, the incumbent
maximizes an objective function that looks like (18) with b and c being also positive and
equal to a=1. Thus, the reduced form objective function in such a model is exactly like a
combination of the objective function of the probabilistic voting model and of (27), which is
the special case a=b=c=1 in (18). If the maximand of this problem is an interior solution, then
it lies between TLobby and Tproba. In this case, the equilibrium regulatory tax is decreasing in
the homeownership rate.
Pre- and post-electoral politics
As we have seen, the ‘influence for sale’ lobbying model and the probabilistic voting model
can be thought of as special, but non-trivial, special cases of the reduced form weighted social
welfare function (18). They are also flexible enough to encompass a variety of sub-cases. For
instance we have shown how the parameters b and c can capture economic variables such as
the homeownership rate and sociological variables such as the ideological heterogeneity of
various socio-economic groups.
An interesting combination is one in which the planner cares both about voters (because
she might face re-election or because she is benevolent to some extent) and about lobbying
contributions (because she needs the money to run again in the future or because she is
corrupt). In this situation, her objective function is (18) with b,c>0 and a>0. If a is large
compared to b and c, then post electoral politics are a very important determinant of policy
choices. By contrast, if b and c are large compared to a then pre-electoral politics matter most
in the determination of T. Finally, consider the situation in which homeowners and tenants are
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also organized and lobby the government, in addition to being voters. Normalize a to unity; in
this case, b>1 and c>1 because WT and WO entertwice – once as groups of voters, once as
a contributing lobbies.
5. Conclusions
Homeowners favor land use regulation as many authors claim (e.g., Fischel 2003; Glaeser,
Gyourko and Saks 2005b). However we have shown in this paper that this does not
necessarily imply that a higher homeownership rate should be associated with tighter land use
restrictions. Actually, the stylized facts we uncover in the introduction suggest the exact
opposite: US metro areas with a larger fraction of homeowners are less regulated. Similarly
larger cities and surrounding urbanized local municipalities with lower homeownership rates
tend to be regulated earlier than suburban municipalities (with higher homeownership rates) at
greater distance to the CBD.
So what does explain land use regulation? In a companion paper (Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud 2006) we claim that more desirable and hence more developed places are more
regulated. The underlying theoretical model is a lobbying model, in which the planning board
maximizes the sum of contributions from land developers (owners of undeveloped land) and
contributions from owners of developed land; in the mould of the ‘influence for sale’
lobbying model of Section 4, this is equivalent to maximizing aggregate land rents. In the
terminology of this paper, the social welfare function puts an equal weight on both owners of
developed land (homeowners and landlords of existing properties) and owners of
undeveloped land depending on the aggregated land rents. The empirical findings for a cross-
section of 82 US metro areas confirm the predictions of the model implying that land-use
planning outcomes may not only be the outcome of a voting process but also that of lobbying.
Future empirical research may shed further light on this proposition.
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Tables
Table 1: Relationship between Homeownership and Regulatory Restrictiveness
Metropolitan Area
Home
Ownership
Rate i)
1990 Rank
Regulatory
Tax in % of
House Value ii)
1998 Rank
Regulatory
Index iii)
1980s Rank
Baltimore 63.6% 10 1.8% 11 0.80 8
Birmingham 68.2% 6 0% 12 -0.46 16
Boston 56.7% 17 18.6% 7 0.86 7
Chicago 61.0% 12 5.7% 10 -1.01 20
Cincinnati 63.7% 9 0% 12 0.16 12
Detroit 69.5% 3 0% 12 -0.69 19
Houston 55.1% 18 0% 12 -0.52 17
Los Angeles 48.2% 20 33.9% 3 1.21 4
Minneapolis 68.9% 5 0% 12 -0.16 15
New York 33.3% 21 12.2% 8 2.21 1
Newport News, VA 59.5% 13 20.7% 6
Oakland 58.8% 16 32.1% 4 0.10 14
Philadelphia 69.7% 2 0% 12 0.47 9
Pittsburgh 70.0% 1 0% 12 0.26 11
Providence 59.1% 14 0% 12 0.35 10
Rochester, NY 67.9% 7 0% 12 -0.68 18
Salt Lake City 67.4% 8 11.9% 9 0.96 5
San Francisco 48.3% 19 53.1% 1 2.10 2
San Jose 59.1% 15 46.9% 2 1.65 3
Tampa 69.3% 4 0% 12 0.16 13
Washington, D.C. 61.3% 11 21.9% 5 0.86 6
Manhattan >50%
Pair: Rank Correlation Correlation
(Homeownership rate, regulatory tax): -0.67 -0.52
(Homeownership rate, regulatory index): -0.49 -0.65
(Regulatory tax, regulatory index): 0.65 0.68
Sources: i) Homeownership rates are from the Census 1990 (tract level data geographically matched to
the metropolitan area level). ii) Estimated regulatory tax values are from Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks
(2005a). iii) Regulatory index values are from Saks (2005).
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide some microeconomic foundation for our assumption that, in
general, homeowners’ average tenure duration is larger than tenants’ average tenure duration.
To do this, we assume that whenever tenants move out, they have to incur a transaction
cost T whereas, in similar circumstances, homeowners have to incur a costO (‘’ stands for
‘moving’). There is a wide literature arguing that O>T holds in practice.
To focus on endogenous tenure duration differences, let us look at steady state values of
WT and WO. We assume that at each instant dt, there is a probabilitydt that any household
faces a change in its lifestyle that is big enough for it to consider moving out (the opportunity
of getting a new job, of having children, etc.). When this happens, the household compares
WT or WO with the corresponding outside option (i.e. TW or OW ). As in the text, households
are heterogeneous in their valuation of the local amenities, so only a fraction
1 ( )k k kG W W   of households of type k{O,T} will actually move when hit by a shock.
The implicit assumption is that when they are hit by such a shock, households draw a new
idiosyncratic valuation of local amenities. To justify this, consider a household that learns that
it is expecting a first child. In this case, the ideal city to live in might be quite different from a
double-income-no-kid’s ideal home.
In any case, the actual fraction of households of type k that decides to move at any
moment in time, which we denote as k , is given by
(30) [1 ( )], , .k k k kG W W k O T      
Thus, it follows thatO>T implies O<T, ceteris paribus.12 In plain English, given that
moving costs (transaction costs) are higher for homeowners than for tenants, then the latter
are more likely to move out from jurisdiction J than the former when the identity of the
household’s ideal jurisdiction changes. As a result, average duration is larger for homeowners
than for tenants, that is,
(31)
1 1
.O T 
This completes the analysis.
12 A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold throughout is that the difference in transaction costs is
larger than the difference of the difference of economic benefits for the two types, namely:
( ) ( )O T O T O TW W W W      .
